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The “placebo” paradox and the 





Philosophical debates about how best to explain emotion or placebo are debates about how best 
to characterise and explain the distinctive form of human responsiveness to the world that is the 
object of interest for each of those domains of inquiry. In emotion research, the cognitive theory 
of emotion faces several intractable problems. I discuss two of these: the problem of epistemic 
deficit and the problem of recalcitrant emotions. Cognitive explanations in Placebo Studies, such 
as response-expectancy and belief-based explanations, also face the problem of epistemic deficit 
in addition to the problem of logically self-destructive true belief. While such considerations 
might motivate a retreat to affect, this brings its own problems. I argue that it is a particular 
version of cognitivism, representational cognitivism (Rep-Cog), that generates the paradoxes 
we encounter in emotion and placebo research. I propose that turning to nonrepresentational 
accounts of cognition will dissolve these paradoxes. As I move toward conclusion, I propose 
drawing on the ethnomethodological tradition to respecify human responsiveness to loci of 
significance in the lifeworld by undertaking ethnographies of members’ own situated methods for 
making intelligible and accountable their attitudinal and nonattitudinal responsiveness to loci of 
significance in their environment.
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Philosophical debates about how best to explain emotion or placebo are debates about 
how best to characterise and explain the distinctive form of human responsiveness to the 
world that is the object of interest for each of those domains of inquiry. In both cases, 
what is to be explained, the boundaries of the explananda, are identified in the first 
instance with the grammar of the vernacular terms: “emotion” and “placebo.”
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Emotion researchers have tended to fall into one of two explanatory camps, usually 
referred to as Jamesians and Cognitivists. Jamesians explain emotions as essentially 
physiological responses to environmental causal triggers, which are captured by depict-
ing those responses as affective states (e.g., Darwin & Ekman, 1872/1998; Ekman, 2003; 
Griffiths, 1997; James, 1884; Prinz, 2004). Cognitivists have usually explained emotions 
as primarily constituted by thoughts or propositional attitudes (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; 
Nussbaum, 2004; Solomon, 2006; Taylor, 1985).
In Placebo Studies, the debate has been dominated by those who seek to explain “pla-
cebo” in behavioural terms, as a conditioned behavioural response (e.g., Ader, 1988) or 
those who explain it cognitively as an expectancy response (e.g., Kirsch, 1985).
In emotion research, it has been argued that the cognitive theory of emotion faces a 
number of intractable problems (e.g., Deigh, 2004; Griffiths, 1997); I will discuss two of 
these in what follows: the problem of epistemic deficit and the problem of recalcitrant 
emotions (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2003). Similar problems face the currently favoured 
cognitive explanation in Placebo Studies, where, in addition to the problem of epistemic 
deficit, such theories face the problem of the logically self-destructive true belief (Cave, 
2001). While such considerations might motivate a retreat to affect, these bring their own 
problems in both Emotion Research (for an overview, see Leys, 2018; see also my dis-
cussion of Barrett and Prinz in the next section of this article) and Placebo Studies (see, 
e.g., Moerman, 2002; Montgomery & Kirsch, 1997; Rescorla, 1988).
As Jesse Prinz put it in 2003, “cognitive theories give us too much, while non-cogni-
tive theories give us too little” (p. 78). This is our dilemma of adequate explanation and 
what I propose as the central paradox of emotion and placebo research that serves as a 
challenge to psychological explanation.
In what follows, I shall propose that the paradox is generated not by the nature of the 
phenomena under study but by the underlying commitment to a particular way of thinking 
about cognition: what I refer to as Representational Cognitivism (Rep-Cog). Rep-Cog is a 
way of conceiving our responsiveness to loci of significance in the lifeworld as necessarily 
involving representations of the relevant locus of significance. To differentiate between 
representationalist cognitive explanations and nonrepresentationalist explanations, I will 
divide cognitive explanations into three classes: (a) Rep-Cog explanations are those that 
depict emotional responses as constituted and type-individuated by mental representations; 
(b) E-Cog approaches are those that invoke 4E—Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and 
Enacted—cognition and other embodied, enactivist, and ecological approaches, which 
don’t invoke representations; and (c) EM-Cog, which draws on the ethnomethodological 
approach to describe cognition via members’ situated accounting practices.
I will argue that it is Rep-Cog, as a version of cognitivism, that generates the para-
doxes we encounter in emotion and placebo research. I propose that turning to nonrepre-
sentational accounts of cognition will dissolve these paradoxes. As I conclude, I suggest 
routes out of the paradox by drawing on the work of Harold Garfinkel and the eth-
nomethodological tradition to propose respecifying this responsiveness to loci of signifi-
cance in the lifeworld in terms of members’ accounts of their attitudinal and nonattitudinal 
responsiveness to loci of significance. This amounts to a turn away from formal explana-
tory accounts of emotion and placebo and toward ethnographic descriptions of interac-
tive practices.
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I will begin by discussing two candidate explanations for the placebo response, so as 
to explore the problems they face, and identify the source of those problems. I then turn 
to Emotion Research where I will, with the help of two emotions researchers, the psy-
chologist Lisa Feldman Barrett and the philosopher Jesse Prinz, identify the paradox 
faced by emotion researchers. In both cases, of Placebo Studies and Emotion Research, 
my suggestion is that it is representationalism that generates the paradoxes. In the final 
section of this article, I propose a nonrepresentationalist alternative as a way of dissolv-
ing the paradoxes.
Placebo
Current thinking about Pavlovian conditioning differs substantially from that of 20 [now more 
than 50] years ago. Yet the changes that have taken place remain poorly appreciated by 
psychologists generally. Traditional descriptions of conditioning as the acquired ability of one 
stimulus to evoke the original response to another because of their pairing are shown to be 
inadequate. They fail to characterize adequately the circumstances producing learning, the 
content of that learning, or the manner in which that learning influences performance. Instead, 
conditioning is now described as the learning of relations among events so as to allow the 
organism to represent its environment. (Rescorla, 1988, p. 151)
I believed I should get better solely because the pill would make me better, but I now know the 
pill will not. It is solely my belief that will make me better; but the belief about the pill is 
false—so I no longer hold that belief. Hence, I shall not get better. (Cave, 2001, p. 145)
Placebo Studies, with its own interdisciplinary international society (The Society for 
Interdisciplinary Placebo Studies, SIPS), which hosted its inaugural conference in spring 
2017, is now a bonafide subject area, comprised of researchers from a range of discipli-
nary backgrounds, including anthropology, medicine, philosophy, psychology, and neu-
roscience. To the uninitiated, the term “placebo effect” can seem like an oxymoron.1 
There is an obvious tension between predicating of something that it is inert while at the 
same time talking of its effects. However, the subject matter of placebo studies is not the 
placebo—the pharmacologically inert dummy pill, or the sham surgical intervention—
historically given to “please” the patient, but more recently employed as an important 
control in randomised controlled trials (RCTs); the subject matter might be said to be the 
puzzle, the problem in need of a solution, that presents itself to us when we observe par-
ticipants responding in medically significant ways to the administering of inert pills or 
sham surgery.
The placebo problem, what has been described as a paradox,2 has this form: the 
administering of dummy pills or sham surgery has been demonstrated to be reliably 
associated with measurable and medically significant recovery in significant percent-
ages of participants for a diverse range of medical conditions, in well-constructed 
RCTs. The correlation is reproducible and reliable enough to warrant proposing a 
causal link, yet placebo pills, both by design and verifiably, contain no pharmacologi-
cal properties with relevant causal powers, and placebo surgery is not surgery but 
sham surgery, designed purely to deceive the participant. Placebos are inert, they are 
designed to be so; therefore, something else is taking place. There is something in the 
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practice, context, or the meaning, of administering drugs and carrying out surgery that 
has reliable and medically significant effects. Placebo Studies seeks to explain this.
For example, what is the explanation for why the person endogenously produces 
dopamine when administered a dummy pill in trials for a treatment for Parkinson’s 
Syndrome, thereby endogenously mimicking the dopamine that would have been intro-
duced exogenously had the participant received the medically active intervention (see de 
la Fuente-Fernández et al., 2006)? What explains placebo pain relief, where patient 
reporting, endogenous dopamine release, and fMRI data all seem to support the conclu-
sion that pain has been suppressed in response to taking an inactive, dummy pill (Wager 
& Atlas, 2015)? What explains those participants who have undergone sham stent sur-
gery, where no stent has been inserted, having measurable recovery rates equivalent to 
those who had received the stent insertion (Al-Lamee et al., 2018; Wise, 2017)? What 
explains medically significant responses to dummy pills of a specific colour for certain 
groups of people but not others (Lucchelli et al., 1978)? What explains the enhanced 
pain-relieving effects of branded versions over nonbranded versions of otherwise identi-
cal aspirin (Branthwaite & Cooper, 1981)?3
While the “placebo response” has been reported and documented for centuries, it is 
only with the emergence of RCTs, and the extent to which these have enabled us to 
isolate through controls what has historically been referred to as the “placebo effect/
response,” that relatively clean and reliable data have emerged. Within Placebo Studies, 
response-expectancy is the explanation that presently enjoys widest allegiance, while 
conditioning is still widely employed as a model for experimental design. At present, 
there is no definitive answer to the questions as to which is the dominant folk under-
standing of placebo and which the most widely held conception of placebo among 
clinicians, though there has been some recent work on this (see, e.g., Hardman et al., 
2019, 2020). It is worth noting also that there are placebo sceptics, researchers who 
have sought to explain away the “placebo response.” Such attempts usually seek to 
depict those responses as mislabelled cases of existing phenomena, the most promi-
nent examples of which are (a) natural history effects (people often get better over 
time), (b) regression to the mean (the statistical equivalent of the natural history effect: 
outliers tend to regress toward the mean), (c) Hawthorne effects (participants are 
behaviourally responding atypically because they are being observed), and (d) report-
ing and perception bias.
While some researchers have sought to explain away “placebo responses” in one or 
more of these ways, such attempts have so far failed to explain away many instances of 
placebo responses, or those attempts have been simply flawed in execution.4 There is still 
something in need of explanation, and the two most prominent explanations are classical 
conditioning and response-expectancy.
Classical conditioning is comprised of patterned causal sensory stimuli (A) that 
are reliably associated over time with another distinct set of sensory stimuli (B), 
which results in the development of a “trigger mechanism” (C). Once developed, this 
“mechanism” becomes operative in the presence of sensory stimuli (A) but the 
absence of (B), leading to certain physiological responses hitherto associated with 
sensory stimuli (B) now being “triggered” solely by sensory stimulus/stimuli (A) 
(see Ader, 1988, 1997).
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In response-expectancy, the participant expects to experience changes (ex-C) based 
on their belief that they have received active input (a-I). In response, the participant 
undergoes actual changes (C). Let us say these changes amount to recovery from an ill-
ness or a diminishment of illness symptoms. Unknown to the participant, what they 
believed was active input (a-I) was, in fact, inert input (i-I) and the changes they experi-
enced and that took place (C) were responses to their expectation, which was based on 
the false belief that they had received an active input (a-I), when in fact they had received 
an inert input(i-I) (see Kirsch, 1985, 1997, 2018).
We might characterise these two explanations in the following way:
In a conditioned-response, placebo responses are explained as mechanistic responses 
to stimuli, where those stimuli have been rendered as akin to trigger mechanisms through 
conditioning: we are given pills over time and when we have taken them we have relia-
bly experienced recovery from illness. Over time, a behavioural mechanism is thereby 
established, such that on being administered a pill we experience recovery even though 
it transpires that on this occasion the pill was inert. Comparing our example to Pavlov’s 
dogs, the pill corresponds to the bell, the active pharmacological ingredient corresponds 
to the food, and the recovery corresponds to the salivating.
In response-expectancy, as Irving Kirsch (2018) puts it in a recent overview, “response 
expectancies are predictions of one’s own nonvolitional responses (i.e., automatic reac-
tions) to events” (p. 82). Participants are depicted as responding to the administration of 
placebo based on the (false) belief that they have received something that will initiate 
their recovery. The participant is responding to the expectation/expectancy/anticipation/
prediction5 that they will recover.
The explanatory factors in the response-expectancy explanation are propositional 
attitudes. Placebo responses are explained as attitudes (expectations or expectancies) 
toward propositions, where those propositions represent the expected or anticipated state 
of affairs: “the pill will make me better,” let’s say. Put another way, in being administered 
a pill, a participant expects—has this attitude toward—the following proposition: “this 
pill will cure me.” This expectancy then serves as the trigger for their somatic response.6
Problems for conditioning and response-expectancy
A viable explanation of placebo must meet the challenge posed by three problems arising 
from the research and RCT data.
First, the absence of conditioning. There are cases of “placebo responses” where there 
is nothing that would qualify as classical conditioning. “Conditioning” is not merely a 
synonym for past “experience.”
Second, the epistemic deficit. There are cases of “placebo responses” where the 
knowledge—the epistemic capital—required to form the relevant expectation is absent 
(see Hutchinson & Moerman, 2018). If an explanation invokes mental representations or 
mental models of the world, then for these representations or models to have content, the 
mind needs, at the minimum, access to the information that serves as the building blocks 
for that content.
Third, the role of culture. There are cases of “placebo responses” where participants 
with different cultural backgrounds, different enculturation, not only respond differently, 
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but do so in explanatorily relevant ways, and in ways that cannot be explained by either 
conditioning or expectations (see, e.g., Moerman, 2002, p. 82).
Starting at the top, based on the first problem, it seems we must reject classical con-
ditioning as an explanation. Having rejected conditioning, it can then seem as though 
there are only two available options: “placebo” responses must be either innate reflex-
like responses, or they must be “cognitive.” If we argue that they are the former, we still 
leave ourselves without the resources to explain cultural variance and therefore we can-
not overcome the third problem. So, it seems we are left with cognitivism. “Placebos” 
are cognitive; they are not the result of “classical conditioning” and not innate character-
istics of the species (though it should go without saying that they will draw upon biologi-
cal systems that might be species specific).
Having embraced cognitivism, we now seem to be confronted with another set of 
problems. For the cognitivism favoured by most placebo researchers is representational 
cognition. As we have seen, this version of cognition invokes the propositional attitudes, 
either in the form of semantically encoded representations comprising mental states, 
psychosemantically encoded representations comprising computational states, or, in the 
most recent work (e.g., Kirsch, 2018), representations now rebranded as “models,” 
which are amended in accordance with Bayes’ theorem. Whichever way one goes here, 
what is doing the work are certain representational (or modelled) contents, whether at the 
level of the person expecting x, or subpersonally as computational expectations, or as the 
models amended in accordance with Bayesian rules of probability. In each of these 
approaches, mental representations (models) are the central features and these require 
informational content if they are to represent (or model) in the explanatorily required 
way. However, the second problem, the problem of epistemic deficit, suggests that the 
required information isn’t always present.
Both expectations and beliefs are attitudes, which, when invoked as explanations, as 
they are in cognitive accounts of placebo and emotion, are so as providing intentional 
and meaningful content. Crucially, it is that content that does the explanatory work and 
it therefore needs accounting for. If an explanation of placebo invokes attitudes such as 
expectancies (Kirsch) or beliefs (Cave, 2001; Evans, 2004), those attitudes need content 
so that they can do the explanatory work one is proposing they do. However, there are 
documented occasions when the required epistemic resources are not available to those 
whom our explanations attribute the attitudinal contents.
However, the problems don’t stop with the problem of epistemic deficit; we are also 
confronted by a logical problem in the form of Peter Cave’s (2001) version of the Placebo 
Paradox.
Miranda’s proposal
The Placebo Paradox, as Cave (2001) states it, emerges from the logically self-destruc-
tive nature of the first-person belief that “this pill will make me feel better simply because 
I believe it will make me feel better.” What makes this interesting to logicians, is that it 
stands in contrast to the unproblematic nature of the same belief when ascribed to the 
same participant by a third party: “that pill will make X-Y feel better simply because X-Y 
believes it will make them feel better.” Cave introduces a fictional character, Miranda, to 
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illustrate his point. So, “This pill will make Miranda better solely because she believes 
that this pill will make her better” serves, at least logically, unproblematically as a third-
person expression of belief in placebo effects. Paradoxically, “[t]his pill will make me 
better solely because I believe that this pill will make me better” held by the participant, 
Miranda, is logically self-destructive. This belief is self-destructive because Miranda’s 
new-found true belief that it is her belief in the pill that will make her better destroys her 
otherwise medically operative belief that the pill will make her better. Miranda’s hith-
erto-operative belief that the-pill-will-make-me-feel-better is now cancelled out by her 
new belief that my-belief-that-the-pill-will-make-me-feel-better-is-what-will-make-me-
feel-better (Cave, 2001, pp. 143–144).
As Cave presents matters, we do seem to be faced with a paradox. However, the issue 
here is that we only face Cave’s Placebo Paradox if we ignore the data on placebos and 
insist on explaining placebos, as Cave does, in terms of propositional attitudes.
Let us put this another way by introducing Cave’s (2001) fictional Miranda to an 
actual placebo trial: Let us imagine that 9 years after featuring in Peter Cave’s phi-
losophy paper, Miranda receives a call from Ted Kaptchuk and colleagues (2010), 
asking her to participate in a trial for treatment of Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS). 
After 9 years in the placebo wilderness, Miranda readily accepts. When the trial takes 
place, participants are divided into two groups: a no treatment group and an open-
label placebo group. Miranda finds herself in the open-label placebo group and is 
somewhat surprised, based on her memory of the minor celebrity status she enjoyed 
among philosophers 9 years earlier, to find that believing that this pill will make me 
better solely because I believe that this pill will make me better did not prevent her 
from responding to the administration of the “placebo.” Indeed, it wasn’t only 
Miranda. The conclusion—the actual conclusion—drawn from the trial (which, of 
course, did not include the fictional Miranda), based on 80 participants, was that 
knowing it is a placebo you are receiving does not necessarily nor reliably serve to 
negate the placebo response7 (Kaptchuk et al., 2010).
The dilemma of adequate explanation
The problems faced by explanations that appeal to conditioning might motivate a move 
in the direction of cognitive explanations. But the dominant cognitive explanation for 
placebo responses faces difficulties: the problem of epistemic deficit, Cave’s Placebo 
Paradox, and recent trial data on open-label placebos. Each of these pose problems for an 
account that seeks to explain placebos in terms of representations with propositional 
contents. To overcome this dilemma, we must first differentiate between paradoxes and 
problems that emerge from the nature of the phenomena and those that are products of 
our mode of representation. Put another way, placebos might present a puzzle, but the 
puzzle—what it is that we are responding to when given a dummy pill or undergo sham 
surgery—should not be confused with the problems generated by our favoured form, or 
method, of explanation.
My proposal, which I will elaborate in the third section of this article, is that many of 
the problems faced by placebo research might be dissolved by forgoing the architecture 
of contemporary representational cognitive science and psychology and instead turning 
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to alternative nonrepresentational accounts of cognition. However, before we look at the 
alternatives, we will look at some similar issues in emotion research.
Emotion
The fact that emotions are meaningful, reason sensitive, and intentional suggests that they must 
be cognitive. The fact that some emotions arise without intervention of the neocortex suggests 
that emotions cannot all be cognitive. The emotions that arise in this way seem to be meaningful. 
This seems to suggest that being meaningful does not require being cognitive. Noncognitive 
states are explanatorily anaemic and cognitive states are explanatorily superfluous. Noncognitive 
theories give us too little, and cognitive theories give us too much. Call this the Emotion 
Problem. (Prinz, 2003, p. 78)
[A] fundamental emotion paradox: People are compelltements that we might together label 
“the dilemma of adequate explanation.” by their own experiences to believe that emotions exist 
as natural-kind entities, yet a century of research has not produced a strong evidentiary basis for 
this belief. To date, there is no clear, unambiguous criterion for indicating the presence of anger 
or sadness or fear. (Barrett, 2006, p. 27)
In these two quotations, we find statements that we might together label “the dilemma of 
adequate explanation.” Barrett and Prinz independently argue that this dilemma of ade-
quate explanation serves as a central challenge to attempts to explain emotion.
For Jesse Prinz, emotions are meaningful and they are intentional, which means they 
are directed at or are about an object or state of affairs. However, while being meaningful 
and being directed at or about something, they often take place in the absence of the kind 
of neural activity required for them to qualify, on Prinz’s terms, as cognitive. This gener-
ates the Emotion Problem.
Lisa Feldman Barrett observes that scientific attempts to explain emotions as “natural 
kind entities” have failed, yet folk practically and reliably identify their own emotions 
and the emotions of others. For Barrett, this is the Emotion Paradox.
Differences aside, Barrett and Prinz pick out a shared problem. Barrett notes the 
inability of science to establish the emotion natural kinds, while at the same time observ-
ing that people identify their own and others’ emotions. Prinz lays the emphasis else-
where. For him physiological, or pure Jamesian accounts, cannot explain the meaning 
and intentionality of emotion. At the same time, he observes that emotions can be mean-
ingful and directed at something in the absence of neural activity involving the neocor-
tex. In short, for both Barrett and Prinz, emotions are paradoxical because something 
meaningful and intentional happens without there having been discovered an explana-
torily satisfactory underlying physiological process that would explain them and dif-
ferentiate them from other things.
Affect and physiological changes versus intention and thought
The Emotion Paradox is pressing because explanations of emotion have, until very 
recently, tended to fall into one of two classes of explanation, membership of which is 
determined by the essential explanatory constituents. If an explanation depicts emotions 
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as essentially physiological responses to causal stimuli, and the subject’s awareness of 
these responses, then the explanation is a member of the class of explanations usually 
referred to as Jamesian, named after the 19th-century philosopher, psychologist, and 
physician William James, who argued for such an explanatory framework at the end of 
the 19th century (James, 1884).8 This is emotion explained as affect.9
In contrast, if an explanation depicts emotions as essentially thoughts about, or 
directed toward, something in the world, then the explanation is a member of the class of 
explanations usually referred to as “cognitivist,” an approach to explaining emotion 
traceable, in the Western tradition, to the Stoic movement in Ancient Greece, but with 
advocates in contemporary cognitive psychology, and various philosophical schools. 
This is emotion explained as (embodied) thought.10
Subscribing to a Jamesian approach to explaining emotion, perhaps explaining emo-
tions in terms of patterned changes in the autonomic nervous system or in terms of neural 
activity, and thereby conceiving of emotions as essentially physiological changes triggered 
by causal stimuli in the environment, will lead to our focus being on representing and 
explaining the causal mechanisms. On this view, the person experiencing the emotion is 
subject to that emotion, the emotions are characterisable as “passions,” and a person who 
is in an emotional state is passive. The virtue of such a depiction of emotion is that it meets 
the demand of naturalism; unfortunately it also fails to capture the complexity of human 
psychology and the phenomenology of emotional experience. Moreover, it also faces the 
somewhat difficult problem of accounting for the meaning and intentionality of emotions.
Cognitivists in the philosophy of emotions have generally subscribed to representa-
tional cognition, what I termed Rep-Cog, and provide explanations of emotions that 
depict them as essentially constituted by thoughts. Here, emotions are no longer appro-
priately depicted as passions and the person has a potentially active role in their emo-
tional responses to the world, for it is at least logically (or grammatically) possible to 
achieve some control over one’s emotions, given certain conditions.
One can be, broadly speaking, a Jamesian while laying emphasis on different physi-
ological systems in one’s explanation: perhaps you privilege patterned changes in the 
autonomic nervous system; maybe your primary focus is on the functional role of neural 
systems; or you might follow Charles Darwin and, later, Paul Ekman (Darwin & Ekman, 
1872/1998), and begin by focusing on facial expression. Similarly, cognitivists in the 
philosophy of emotions have differed in the cognitive constituents they have proposed, 
which have included “judgements” (Nussbaum, 2004; Solomon, 2006), “evaluative 
beliefs” (Taylor, 1985), “appraisals” (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1991), or “construals” 
(Roberts, 2003). However, while differing in this way, until recently, most have operated 
with a Rep-Cog account of cognition.
In concluding this section, I will focus on Jamesian and conventional Rep-Cog expla-
nations, because (a) this presents a useful and illustrative parallel to the current state of 
placebo studies and (b) Jamesian and Rep-Cog approaches have been dominant in emo-
tion research.
So, we have two candidate explanatory frameworks for emotion:
•• Jamesian – physiological-causal: (a) Emotions are constituted and type-individu-
ated by underlying physiological states and (b) emotions are passions, the bearer 
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of emotion is passive, and an emotion is a class of physiological response to envi-
ronmental causal stimuli.
•• Rep-Cog – representational cognition: (a) Emotions are constituted and type-indi-
viduated by thoughts, which have propositional form and (b) emotions are 
dynamic, the bearer of emotion has the possibility of agency, and an emotion is 
primarily a class of mental state (or computational state).
The problem is that neither of these two approaches have the resources to dissolve 
Barrett’s Emotion Paradox. Jamesian explanations explain too little, in not explaining the 
meaning and intentionality of emotion, and Rep-Cog explanations demand too much, in 
virtue of their reliance on the propositional attitudes. There are too many cases in which 
we observe emotional episodes but see something akin to the problem of epistemic defi-
cit, which I introduced in the first section of this article: sometimes subjects are in an 
emotional state yet do not possess the knowledge—the epistemic capital—to form the 
explanatory and (allegedly) constitutive propositional attitudes. People can feel shame, 
for example, without knowing why.
Miranda’s fear of flying and recalcitrant emotions
In addition to the problem of epistemic deficit, Rep-Cog explanations also produce a logi-
cal problem that is akin to Peter Cave’s Placebo Paradox (2001). This problem is called the 
Problem of Emotional Recalcitrance (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2003; Griffiths, 1997). The 
problem is as follows: if emotions are constituted by propositional attitudes—beliefs, for 
example–then we have a difficulty when confronted by emotions that seem to emerge 
while the person who is in the emotional state holds beliefs that would serve to undermine 
any beliefs that are claimed to be playing a constitutive and type-individuating role.
To illustrate, we will reacquaint ourselves with Miranda, to whom we were introduced 
in the first section. When we met Miranda last she had reentered the world of academic 
placebo studies, having accepted an invitation to participate in an open-label placebo 
trial for treatment of IBS at Harvard. Having accepted the invitation, (Cave’s fictional) 
Miranda is left contemplating an imminent transatlantic flight. Miranda experiences a 
fear of flying, which, on a Rep-Cog account of emotion, demands that she has an attitude 
(belief, judgement, etc.) toward the proposition, which gives content to that attitude. Let 
us say that Miranda is in possession of the evaluative belief that constitutes her particular 
emotion of fear: flying is dangerous. This is the intentional content of Miranda’s emo-
tion. However, concurrently, Miranda has an attitude (belief, judgement) toward the 
proposition that seems to undermine the intentional content of her emotion (her fear of 
flying). This concurrently entertained second propositional attitude, is an attitude (belief, 
judgement, etc.) toward the proposition that “flying is the safest mode of transport.” A 
Rep-Cog account of emotion seems to entail that, in the case of recalcitrant emotions, 
Miranda concurrently has two mental states, which have the content (a) flying is danger-
ous (which explains the intentional content of her emotion) and (b) flying is safe (which 
Miranda believes because true).
So, as does Placebo Studies, Emotion Research seems to complicate Miranda’s life, 
because as in Placebo Studies, in Emotion Research we arrive at a point at which we face 
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significant difficulties with the explanations on offer. The difficulties result from the 
explanatory appeals to propositionalism.
Beyond representations, beyond propositional attitudes
We have seen that in both Placebo Studies and Emotion Research, having rejected physi-
ological and instinctual explanations—conditioned response and Jamesian physiologi-
cal, respectively—we saw that the alternative was to seek to explain a person’s response 
to the world in terms of cognitive (or mental) representations with propositional content; 
what I termed Rep-Cog. The move to Rep-Cog faces the problem of epistemic deficit and 
the problems highlighted by Barrett and Prinz in emotion research. Moreover, as we saw 
at the end of the previous section, Rep-Cog explanations also face serious problems 
when we consider recalcitrant emotions. This has strong parallels with (cf. the first sec-
tion of this article) the emerging data on open-label placebos and Cave’s (2001) version 
of the Placebo Paradox. Both recalcitrant emotions and the emerging data on the admin-
istering of open-label placebos cannot be simply bracketed out when we seek to explain 
emotion and placebo.
The problem of recalcitrant emotion and its discussion in the emotion literature serves 
to demonstrate a potential framing problem with Cave’s (2001) discussion of (his version 
of) the Placebo Paradox. The Problem of Emotional Recalcitrance is a problem faced by 
a particular form of explanation, and has been presented as such in the literature (e.g., 
D’Arms & Jacobson, 2003); this problem emerges when we acknowledge the phenom-
enology of a significant proportion of emotional experience. If we apply this way of 
thinking about emotional recalcitrance to Cave’s Placebo Paradox, then rather than stat-
ing the paradox as The Placebo Paradox, depicting it as inherent to the phenomena, we 
instead see the paradox as resulting from a particular form of explanation. Having made 
this distinction, we are now in a position to highlight the extent to which such data as that 
emerging from trials on open-label placebo bring into question our assumptions about 
the explanatory framework we have been employing. For, just as the problem of emo-
tional recalcitrance draws into question a particular way of explaining emotion, one that 
employs a Rep-Cog framework, Cave’s Placebo Paradox should draw into question a 
Rep-Cog framework for explaining placebo: response-expectancy.
Hybrid theories, E-Cog, EM-Cog, and the meaning response
In emotion research, Barrett (2006) and Prinz (2003) independently proposed solutions 
that one might depict as neo-Jamesian hybrid theories. For both, emotions were still to 
be conceived primarily as physiological responses, but for Barrett (2006, p. 30) they 
have a conceptual overlay established through acts of categorisation and for Prinz (2003, 
p. 84) they have cognitive qualities bestowed by a theoretical postulation of psychose-
mantic content triggered by core relational themes.
Prinz’s (2003) solution invites representationalism back in, only now psychosemanti-
cally encoded. One might respond to such a move by saying that if representationalism 
doesn’t fare well, following what we’ve argued so far, there is little reason to assume that 
theoretically postulated computational representations with psychosemantic contents 
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will fare any better. Put another way, you can run all the arguments against representa-
tionalist propositional attitude accounts that I have discussed so far while doing so with 
reference to Prinz’s psychosemantically encoded computational representations and the 
result is the same: we would still face Cave’s (2001) paradox, we would still be puzzled 
by the open-label placebo findings, we would still confront the problem of recalcitrant 
emotions, and we would still face, on occasion, the problem of epistemic deficit.
Barrett’s (2006) proposed solution is based on two commitments, which motivate the 
retention of a (neo-)Jamesian framework:
First, Barrett (2006, p. 27) is committed to the idea, and generates a paradox from this 
commitment, that the practical reliability of both first-person and third-person emotion 
ascriptions “compel” people to assume emotions are natural kinds. In response, I would 
argue that there is little reason to believe that people are compelled to assume something 
is a natural kind because it is reliably identified by them, much less for us to believe it is 
a natural kind on this basis. This is a quite basic running together of epistemological and 
ontological categories. I reliably recognise my aesthetic appreciation for my bicycle. I 
also reliably identify this kind of appreciation in my 11-year-old son, when he is riding 
or cleaning his bike. Am I compelled to conclude that such appreciation is a natural kind, 
as opposed to something that is the product of learning and enculturation and accom-
plished through interaction?
Second, Barrett is committed to an account of first-person emotion utterances as being 
reports of inner states. Again, there is little warrant for such a commitment. If you are com-
mitted to first-person, present-tense emotion utterances being reports of inner states, you 
will very likely proceed to assume that explanations of emotions must, primarily, be con-
cerned with “discovering,” theoretically postulating, or providing conceptual overlay so as 
to render intelligible these putatively inner states. This returns us to the first assumption.
Both Prinz and Barrett are constrained by their prior ontological commitments. They 
are both committed to the belief that emotion terms must, in essence, name something 
behind the skin, so to speak. This is compounded in Prinz’s approach because he assumes 
that “cognition” is the name for brain processes involving the neocortex, and this gener-
ates a problem for him when he observes that some emotions occur and remain meaning-
ful in the absence of neocortical intervention. Having thus generated the problem, he sees 
his task as theoretically postulating something to which “cognition” might refer in such 
cases, rather than, perhaps, reconsidering his conception of cognition in light of his 
observations about the phenomenology of emotion.
Barrett resists the temptation to theoretically postulate a solution, and instead 
appeals to contextually fixed conceptual overlays to underlying physiological pro-
cesses, which thereby afford those processes hitherto elusive explanatory power. 
However, commitments regarding the grammar of first-person, present-tense psycho-
logical utterances lead Barrett to assume that physiological systems must play a pri-
mary and essential explanatory role.
Barrett and Prinz and hybrid theories 1.1. In recent work, it appears that Jesse Prinz has 
moved beyond the computational hybrid solution he proposed in 2003 and 2004, and, 
along with co-author Daniel Shargel, now advocates an enactive and ecological account 
of cognition, marrying enactive insights to an account of affordances. Unfortunately, this 
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doesn’t represent the progress that it might initially suggest because talk of representa-
tions is still central (see Shargel & Prinz, 2018). If representations still figure, the expla-
nation still fails for the reasons we have rehearsed above.
Lisa Feldman Barrett has developed a different account of emotion in recent years. In 
her most recent writings, Barrett draws on Bayesian Predictive Processing to provide an 
explanation of emotion, thereby advancing a theory similar to that which Irving Kirsch 
has recently begun to embrace in Placebo Studies. Barrett’s work isn’t successful in 
overcoming the problems I have discussed here, because, as we noted in the first section, 
Bayesian brains and theories of predictive processing still depend on mental representa-
tions, though often rebranded as “models” (see Barrett, 2017).
In Placebo Studies, a number of authors have recently turned to “predictive process-
ing” and Bayesian brains (e.g., Kirsch, 2018; Ongaro & Kaptchuk, 2019) and (nonradi-
cal) enactivism (Ongaro & Ward, 2017). Unfortunately, this does not protect them from 
the problems we have reviewed in this article because they still invoke representations, 
only now rebranded as (Bayesian) “models.”
E-Cog—4E cognition and ecological psychology. Nonrepresentationalist approaches to our 
responsiveness to loci of significance and our object-involving abilities come in a variety 
of forms, such as Ecological Psychology (Chemero, 2009; Costall, 1995, 2017; J. J. 
Gibson, 1979a; Heft, 2013), Radical Enactivism (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017), and Eth-
nomethodology (Coulter, 1991; Garfinkel, 1967; Sharrock & Coulter, 1998). I here 
abbreviate Ecological and Radical Enactive accounts to E-Cog. The ethnomethodologi-
cal approach to finding the intelligibility in our responsiveness to loci of significance in 
the lifeworld and our object-involving abilities, I here label EM-Cog.
Both E-Cog and EM-Cog emerge out of and are developments of the insights of exis-
tential phenomenology, and in some cases Pragmatist and Wittgensteinian insights. I 
won’t say more here about E-Cog approaches; the interested reader might refer to Hutto 
and Myin (2013, 2017) or to Chemero (2009), and for a recent critical discussion, 
Hutchinson (2019b).
EM-Cog—Cognition in an ethnomethodological mode. What is required is a way of explain-
ing our responsiveness to loci of significance in the lifeworld that doesn’t serve to gener-
ate the paradoxes we have observed so far. While this means we must reject 
representationalist accounts of cognition, it doesn’t amount to an eliminativist project 
about attitudes. Expectancies might well figure in many of the accounts one gives of a 
placebo response, for example. However, the point is that it’s not the expectancy-as-a-
cognitive-item or as a mental representation that is doing the work here. If expectancies 
are to figure in the account of the responsiveness in which we are interested, then we 
respecify attitudes as witnessable states of persons, made available for anlaysis by people 
in and through their interactive practices.
Respecifying attitudinal content: “To represent” is something people do. As an alternative to 
the formal specification of attitudinal content as a proposition abstracted from its use, we 
now respecify attitudinal content as an accomplishment of members of a society, embed-
ded in and acting on the world.
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So, this is the first proposal: we respecify attitudinal content. If we identify an emo-
tional response as being constituted by an attitude, perhaps, following Robert Solomon 
(e.g., 2006), as a judgement, then we do so because in observing members responding 
emotionally we observe their methods of accomplishing judgement and making that 
judgement available to analysis in their interactive practices. Judgements are part of the 
social currency of human inter- and transactional behaviour, and as such are witnessable 
in the contexts in which they are accomplished and exercised. Our methods should be 
tailored to fit these witnessable social phenomena, so that we replace psychological the-
ory with ethnographic practice.
The primary ethnomethodological insight is that interaction relies upon parties to the 
interaction finding each other intelligible and seeing the meaning of each other’s actions. 
Garfinkel (1967), and the ethnomethodological tradition that has developed from his 
work, has shown us that this intelligibility is the product of the situated, endogenously 
produced methodic practices of those same interactants. Members of society employ 
ethno-methods to produce, maintain, and repair the conditions for interaction. In terms of 
our resources for explanation, members’ situated practices and the meaning they have for 
the participants in the setting now replace formal accounts, which invoke propositions, 
abstracted from those practices. Until now we have had a choice between explanations 
that essentialise the physiological-instinctive or conditioned-instinctive responses or 
those that essentialise the cognitive and invoke mental representations. We are now in a 
position to introduce an alternative approach of members’ situated practices of accom-
plishing and making accountable and witnessable their attitudes to loci of significance in 
the lifeworld. Ethnographic descriptions of the ethno-methods and the interactive prac-
tices replaces the theoretical specification of the formal account.
As the data emerges from ethnographies, we might find, as some of the existing stud-
ies have suggested, that attitudes—judgements, expectations/expectancies, beliefs—
don’t always figure in the responses to the relevant loci of significance. This suggests to 
us something that existential phenomenologists, among others, have sought to remind us: 
there are modes of engagement with and modes of responsiveness to the world that are 
not reducible to instinct while also not involving representations of the world, whether 
those representations be mental or witnessable practical social phenomena.
Nonattitudinal meaning responsiveness. Reorienting our thinking away from formal 
accounts of our responsiveness to loci of significance in the lifeworld to members’ prac-
tices of accounting for their responsiveness serves to help overcome some of the prob-
lems we have encountered with Rep-Cog accounts. However, it doesn’t yet serve as a 
way out of the problem of epistemic deficit that we encountered in both Emotion 
Research and Placebo Studies. For this we need to recover a mode of responsiveness to 
loci of significance that does not invoke attitudes but doesn’t thereby collapse into a kind 
of instinctual responsiveness to causal impacts. One reason why we need to resist the 
collapse into a stimulus–response model is that our emotional responses and placebo 
responses are responses to the meaning the lifeworld has for those who are responsive in 
the relevant way, and this meaning can be sensorial and unavailable to representation in 
addition to being context-bound, occasioned, and indexical: the meaning it has is the 
meaning it has for this person, in this context, on this occasion. We require an account of 
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responsiveness that can accommodate a person’s responsiveness to loci of significance 
without requiring that we explain it in terms of attitudes, if our ethnographies show, on 
occasion, those attitudes to simply not be present or operative.
The Existential Phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Samuel Todes, and 
Hubert Dreyfus has furnished us with one way of depicting this mode of engagement 
with and responsiveness to the world as “fully absorbed coping” (Dreyfus, 2002; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2002; Todes, 2001).11 Merleau-Ponty describes this mode of engagement 
and responsiveness via metaphors of “attractive” and “repulsive” forces that are solicited 
by loci of significance in the lifeworld. One finds a similar attempt at specifying a 
responsiveness irreducible to either stimulus–response or attitudinal content in the eco-
logical psychology of James J. Gibson (J. J. Gibson, 1979b) and the affordance theorists 
who have followed him (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Heft, 2001). Here the metaphors of exis-
tential phenomenology are replaced with a theoretical account of the organism’s percep-
tion of loci of significance as affording it possibilities for action.
Where, for existential phenomenology, the lifeworld solicits our responses, which we 
experience as “forces” of “repulsion” or “attraction,” for ecological psychologists, the life-
world affords possibilities for action, which we perceive as affordances and to which we 
respond by acting in the afforded way. Both these accounts seek to capture engagement 
with and responsiveness to the world that doesn’t involve attitudinal content while also 
resisting reducing that engagement and responsiveness to stimulus–response. There are 
two things of note in the accounts of responsiveness advanced by the existential phenom-
enologists and the ecological psychologists. First, both deny any role for concepts in their 
respective accounts of responsiveness; and second, both accounts are formal analytic 
accounts: in phenomenology via the analysist’s introduction of metaphors to represent a 
person’s responsiveness and in ecological psychology via the representation of a person’s 
engagement and responsiveness in the theory of affordances. Both existential phenomenol-
ogy and ecological psychology introduce analyst’s concepts to formally represent mem-
bers’ first-person experiences of responsiveness to loci of significance in the lifeworld.
As an alternate to the formal analysis of our engagement with and responsiveness to 
the world, EM-Cog proceeds by seeking to recover and document members’ own 
accounts of the meaning the world has for them and their ways of making that available 
for analysis by both lay and professional analysists. Again, one method for doing this 
would be ethnographic, or more specifically, ethnomethodologically informed sensory 
ethnographies, perhaps also including follow-up (sensory) ethnographic interviews. 
Here, we would focus on the ways in which the meanings the settings have for members 
are the product of members’ interactive practices and in being so are rendered account-
able and available to analysists, both lay and professional (see, e.g., W. Gibson & Lehn, 
2020; Hindmarsh & Pilnick, 2007; Pink, 2015).
Conclusion
The meaning response, ethno-methods, and sensory ethnography
Explaining emotion responses and placebo responses in terms of propositional attitudes 
and mental representations (or mental models), throws up the paradoxes we encountered 
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in the first two sections of this article. Moving to an EM-Cog account of attitudinal con-
tent is to move to an examination of attitudinal contents as occasioned, indexical, endog-
enously produced practical phenomena, which are available for analysis to both lay and 
professional analysts.
We have also seen the need to go beyond attitudinal accounts and overcome the instinct–
cognitive dichotomy. We now acknowledge that between instinctive, physiological 
responses to causal stimuli on the one hand, and attitudinal responses on the other, there is a 
mode of responsiveness to loci of significance in the lifeworld that is not stimulus–response, 
because it is intentional, meaningful, and indexical, yet nor is it attitudinal (and representa-
tional). While existential phenomenology and Ecological Psychology propose formal–ana-
lytic accounts of this mode of responsiveness, I recommend that here too we might instead 
pursue the policies proposed by ethnomethodology and undertake ethnomethodologically 
informed (sensory) ethnographies so that we might recover the ways in which members 
make available-to-observation and acknowledgement, to lay and professional analysts, their 
nonattitudinal responsiveness to meaningful loci of significance in the lifeworld.
Emotion and placebo responses are responses to meaningful phenomena. While occa-
sionally those responses will involve attitudes, such as beliefs, expectations/expectan-
cies, and judgements, on other occasions, they will not. Sometimes, emotion and placebo 
responses will be nonattitudinal responses to loci of significance. Here the person might 
be responsive to the meaning something has for them but that responsiveness does not 
involve having taken an attitudinal stance: the meaning is exhibited in their behaviour or 
their (nonattitudinal) response. For example, consider emotional response to a hand com-
ing to rest on the back of your hand when you are distressed, emotional response to scent 
or sound, to a swelling orchestral movement, or to choral singing that moves you to tears, 
while being in a language you don’t understand. Then consider a placebo response to a 
particular colour of pill, or a more pronounced placebo response to pills with a bitter 
taste, or consider how “placebo” surgery seems more powerful than the administration of 
“placebo” pills (see, e.g., Harris, 2016). These, I submit, are examples of nonattitudinal 
emotional and “placebo” responses.
Having made this switch away from Rep-Cog accounts, we can approach questions 
about emotion and “placebo” responses as questions about a specific kind of meaning 
response, and set about the task of gaining a better understanding of these meaning 
responses, via EM-Cog ethnographies of people responding in emotional or medically 
significant ways to loci of significance in the lifeworld.
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Notes
 1. Some authors (see Blease et al., 2017; Kirsch, 2019; Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1999) have sought 
to stipulate a distinction between the terms “placebo response” and “placebo effect.” Kirsch 
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and Sapirstein (1999) were the first to propose such a distinction and they did so by extending 
a distinction made in the 1960s by Fisher et al. (1965), who argued for a distinction between 
“drug response” and “drug treatment.” I don’t believe the distinction Kirsch and Sapirstein 
propose is either obviously analogous to what Fisher et al. proposed or helpful. Moreover, 
their stipulation has not been widely taken up in the literature.
 2. See, for example, Koshi and Short (2007, p. 11). What Koshi and Short, and I, refer to as the 
placebo paradox is different to Peter Cave’s Placebo Paradox.
 3. There have been a number of systematic reviews and meta-analyses of branded versus nonbranded 
drugs and very few show clinically significant differences in effects (see Kesselheim et al., 2009; 
Manzoli et al., 2016). One possible explanation is that the placebo-enhanced effect that brand-
ing might have is nullified when drugs are prescribed and administered by a clinician, because 
in such cases the patient isn’t choosing, often doesn’t get to see the packaging, and they trust the 
clinical judgement of their physician in prescribing. By contrast, in the case of over-the-counter 
(OTC) meds and self-medication, things might be different. In the case of OTC medications, the 
patient selects (for example) the branded aspirin, ibuprofen, or cetirizine from a shelf on which 
there are likely to be generic, unbranded, plain-packaged and very cheap aspirin, ibuprofen, ceti-
rizine racked alongside branded and expensive versions of the same meds. The branded meds are 
presented in packages that have been carefully designed to emphasise certain healing properties, 
and those brands and that packaging will probably have been marketed via various media too. The 
difficulty we face here is one of obtaining quality data comparing branded and non branded OTC, 
self-selected, and self-medicated drugs because the data would be based on patient reporting of 
their symptoms, and could therefore be compromised by perception or reporting bias.
 4. For a discussion and critique of a prominent flawed attempt by Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche 
(2001, 2010) to explain away placebo, see Hutchinson and Moerman (2018), which draws on 
Howick et al. (2013).
 5. Each of these terms appears in Kirsch’s schema over the years.
 6. I have argued elsewhere that propositions cannot refer when cut off from their use by people 
in a context and on an occasion. I won’t replay these arguments in the present paper. See 
Hutchinson (2019b).
 7. The Open-Label Placebo studies are small-scale. We should exercise caution in drawing any 
firm conclusions from these early small-scale trials.
 8. The Jamesian theory is sometimes referred to as the James–Lange theory, because the Danish 
physiologist Carl Lange arrived at the same theory at around the same time.
 9. “Affect” is now often used as a synonym for “emotion.” Its use in the contemporary literature 
is not without problems. See Leys (2018) for an overview and Hutchinson (2019a) for further 
critique.
10. See Hutchinson (2009) for a more detailed overview of Jamesianism and Cognitivism in the 
philosophy of emotions.
11. Some phenomenologists have depicted such a mode of responsiveness in terms of judgements 
(e.g., Dreyfus, 2002; Solomon, 2003), though they go on to specify these attitudes as not only 
without content but as being nonconceptual. This is a conception of judgement that departs 
significantly from our ordinary concept, and that amounts to a glossing of the responsiveness 
it is being recruited to represent. For this reason, I think it unhelpful to introduce the attitudi-
nal language here, unless we find that members do so.
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